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I.
A.

Nature of the Case

This case involves the interpretation of a homeowners policy issued by Respondent to
Appellant for real property located at 2510 N. 34th Street, Boise, Idaho. The structure and
attached fixtures were completely destroyed by the tenant, and Appellant sought to be reimbursed
for the losses under the Policy. Respondent denied Appellant's claim, citing exclusions under
the Policy. This District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent, holding that
the exclusions applied and that there was no coverage for the losses. Appellant appeals that
decision, and seeks an order from this Court that, based upon the uncontested facts and the plain
language of the Policy, there is coverage for the losses and the exclusions do not apply.

B.

Statement of Facts

Appellant Shammie Fisher owns real property located at 2510 N. 34th Street, Boise,
Idaho. On or about November 5, 2008, USAA Casualty Insurance Company issued Appellant a
Homeowners Insurance Policy for the residence located at 2510 N. 34th Street, which at that time
was her primary residence. The Policy was renewed annually by USAA and/or for Garrison
Property and Casualty Company (hereafter "Garrison"). The Policy in effect from the period
March 8, 2013 to March 8, 2014, is attached to the Amended Complaint as Exhibit A (R. at 11).
The Policy states in the Declarations that the Described Location is 2510 N. 34th Street,
Boise, Ada County, Idaho. See Policy, Declarations (R. at 13). At the time the Policy was issued,

(R. at 7); Aff.

Shammie Fisher at 12 (Rat 84).

In February of 201

Appellant signed a contract for lease to own ("Lease") of the

Property with Ron Reynosa ("Reynosa"). The Lease was for a 1 year term, ending on March 31 si,
2013, with the option for a 6 month extension ending on Sept 1, 2013. See Aff. of Shammie
Fisher, at 1 3-4, and Ex. A (R. at 84; 88). Within the first two months, Appellant was notified
that the entire home had been leveled by Mr. Reynosa, destroying both the structure and the
fixtures therein. Id. at <JI 5 (R. at 84 ). Photographs of the property before and after the destruction
are attached as Exhibit C and D, to the Affidavit of Shammie Fisher. (R. at 116; 118). Appellant
had no knowledge that Mr. Reynosa intended to destroy the home when he leased the Property.
Id. at 16 (R. at 84).
Reynosa subsequently defaulted on the Lease and left town, informing Appellant
September 2013 that he did not intend to rebuild the home he had destroyed. Id. at 1 7 (R. at 84 ).
On or about September 27, 2013, Appellant submitted a Proof of Loss seeking coverage
under the Policy for the losses to the dwelling and the personal property therein. By letter of
December 5, 2013, Garrison denied coverage for the loss. Amended Complaint, at 1. 14 (R. at
46); Answer to Amended Complaint, at 114 (R. at 74).
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment before the District Court, arguing that
the facts were not in dispute. The District Court found that the loss was covered under the Policy
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applied and granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent. The District Court erred in
holding that the exclusion applied because that exclusion is intended to apply to situations where
an insured is involved in some way or has knowledge of plans to repair or remodel property.
This case is not one where the insured hired or contracted with a third party to do repairs
or renovations that were either incomplete or poorly done. This is a case where a lessee/buyer,
who was to be living in the residence and had the option of making cosmetic improvements
while residing there, tore the residence down to the foundation. This act of destruction was not
part of any valid contract, was unauthorized and was done without the knowledge of the
Appellant. After the destruction was discovered, the Appellant did not then enter into a
"contract" with the lessee to have the damage repaired. Rather, she allowed the lessee to
continue to pay rent and attempt to fix the property damage he had caused in an attempt to
mitigate her damages. There is no evidence in the record that the tenant actually completed any
work to fix the damage he caused or made any repairs. This is not the type of factual situation
that is covered by the exclusions in the Policy.

II.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

l.

Did the District Court err when it determined that the insurance policy did not
provide insurance coverage for Plaintiffs claimed losses to real and personal
property, granting summary judgment in favor Respondent?
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were

as

issue of whether the intentional loss exclusion in the policy applied, and in failing
to grant summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff on that issue?
3.

Did the District Court err in holding that the exclusion for faulty, inadequate
and/or defective work applied in this case?

III.

ARGUMENT

A.

Legal Standards

In reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, this Court has held that '·it
uses the same standard properly employed by the district court originally ruling on the motion.'·
Ri:::zo v. State Farm Ins. Co., 155 Idaho 75, 79. 305 P.3d 519, 523 (2013) (citations omitted).

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c).
In general, "policies of insurance, as other contracts, are to be construed in their ordinary
meaning. and where the language employed is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion to
construe a policy differently than manifested by the plain words therein." Porter v. Farmers Ins.

Co. ofidaho, 102 Idaho 132,136,627 P.2d 311,315 (1981). However, the Idaho Supreme Court
has clearly explained certain special rules to be applied relative to construction of policies of
msurance:
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a

an unambiguous
document is a question of law. Further, insurance policies are a
matter of contract between the insurer and the insured. So,
interpretation of an unambiguous insurance contract is a question
of law subject to free review. But, where there is an ambiguity in
an insurance contract, special rules of construction apply to protect
the insured. Under these special rules, insurance policies are to be
construed most liberally in favor of recovery, with all ambiguities
being resolved in favor of the insured. Finally, the meaning of the
insurance policy and the intent of the parties must be determined
from the plain meaning of the insurance policy's own words.

Hall v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 313, 179 P.3d 276 (2008). The foregoing
rules apply to construction of the applicable Policy provisions. In this case, the clear language of
the Policy provides coverage for Appellant's loss.
There is no dispute as to the Policy in place at the time of the loss. See Amended
Complaint, at 5, Ex A; Answer, at 'J[ 5 (R. at 11-31; 33). The Named Insured in the Policy is
Shammie L. Fisher and the Described Location is 25 ION. 34th Street, Boise, Ada, ID. Policy
Declarations, at 3. The Dwelling Policy provides coverage for the following:
We cover:
1.
The Dwelling on the Described Location shown in the
Declarations, used principally for dwelling purposes, including
structures attached to the dwelling;
Policy, at 2 (R. at 21 ). The District Court noted that Respondent had not offered any opposition
to the argument that the loss of her residence was a direct loss covered by the Policy, and thus
granted summary judgment on the issue of whether the direct loss of the residence was covered
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not at
District Court then correctly noted that, once it is established that

loss is covered,

the burden shifts to the Respondent to demonstrate that an exclusion applies. Decision, at 7 (R.
at 229). Accordingly, Respondent bears the burden of proving that its asserted exclusions are
applicable in this case:
Furthermore, an insurance policy will generally be construed so
that the insurer bears the burden of proving that the asserted
exclusion is applicable.
Perry v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 130 Idaho 100, 103,936 P.2d 1342, 1345 (Ct. App. 1997)

(citing Viani v. Aetna Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 22,501 P.2d 706 (1972); Harman v. Northwestern
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 91 Idaho 719,429 P.2d 849 (1967)). Respondent did not meet that burden

in this case.
Additionally, if language the of the exclusion is "ambiguous," in that it lends itself to
more than one possible interpretation, the court "must resolve any doubt in favor of the insured,
strictly construing the contract against the drafter." Farmers Ins. Group v. Sessions, 100 Idaho
914,916,607 P.2d 422,424 (1980) (citing Abbie Uriguen Olds., Buick, Inc., v. United States
Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501,511 P.2d 783 (1973); Stephens v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 92 Idaho

537,447 P.2d 14 (1968)).
In this case, Respondent did not meet its burden of demonstrating that either exclusion
cited by it applied to the facts in this case, and summary judgment should have been granted in
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on
B.

The Intentional Loss Exclusion Does Not Apply and the
District Court Erred in Failing To Grant Summary Judgment
in Favor of Appellant on that Issue

The first exclusion raised by Respondent as a basis for denying coverage for the dwelling
and fixtures is the exclusion for intentional loss, which provides:
We do not insure for loss caused directly or indirectly by any of the
following.
h.
Intentional Loss, meaning any loss arising out of any act
committed:
(I)
by or at the direction of you or any person or organization
named as an additional insured; and
(2)
with the intent to cause a loss.
Policy, at 7-8 (R. at 26-27).
In this case, there is absolutely no evidence that Ron Reynoso destroyed the dwelling and
fixtures at the Insured Location "at the direction" of Appellant or that Appellent directed the
destruction of her property with "intent to cause a loss." The undisputed facts demonstrate that
Ron Reynoso leased the property with the intent to purchase it, that he represented to the
Appellant that he would live in the dwelling during the time he leased it as his primary residence,
that he would make certain improvements to the dwelling such as updating the flooring,
bathroom and kitchen countertops and other cosmetic "improvements" and would be attempting
to resell the property at a later date. See Fisher Aff., at <JI 6, 9, and Ex. A (R. at 84-85; 88-102).
There is absolutely no evidence that Ron Reynoso was authorized to tear down or otherwise
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or

or

was aware

at 84-84). Likewise, there is no evidence that Appellant directed him to destroy the property with
the intent to cause a loss. Accordingly, the exclusion for intentional loss does not apply.
As to the intentional loss exclusion, the District Court erred in denying Appellant's
motion for summary judgment because the material facts regarding Appellant's directing or
authorizing the acts which caused the loss were not in dispute. Specifically, the District Court
erred in holding that "whether Reynoso's activities were authorized by Fisher presents genuine
issues of material fact which preclude summary judgment on the issue of whether the intentional
loss exclusion applies." Decision, at 9 (R. at 231 ).
In looking at whether Reynoso' s acts were authorized, it is important to determine when
the acts causing the loss occurred. The loss was the unauthorized tear down of the property.
Thus, in determining whether the exclusion applies, the District Court should only have focused
on the evidence of direction of Appellant with the intent to cause a loss prior to the total
destruction of the residence. Prior to the destruction of the residence, the only evidence in the
record regarding Appellant's direction to Reynoso was her Affidavit and the Purchase and Sale
Agreement. The Purchase and Sale Agreement's provision regarding improvements Mr.
Reynoso intended to make to the property provided only that "Buyer intends to make certain
improvements to the property upon possession, with the intent to sell the property for a profit ...
the Buyer is required to give a monthly update for plans/upgrades." Purchase and Sale
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at

1, 19

at

"improvements" to the property contemplated by the parties comes from the Affidavit of
Shammie Fischer, wherein she stated that the "improvements" contemplated by the parties
included such things as new flooring or upgrades to the kitchen and bathroom floors and
counters. Fisher Aff., at 'I[ 9 (R. at 85). There was no discussion or agreement for the Buyer to
demolish or rebuild any portion of the premises or remodel the structure. Id. This is consistent
with the fact that the Buyer indicated that he intended to use the property as his primary residence
during the term of the lease/purchase. See id.; Purchase and Sale Agreement ("Purchase and Sale
Agreement"), at 4, 'I[ 19 (R. at 91). The Purchase and Sale Agreement authorized Reynoso to
make some cosmetic improvements if he so chose while residing in the Property. However, the
purpose of the Real Estate Purchase Agreement was to sell the Property and to Lease it to
Reynoso prior to a sale. The purpose of the contract was not for Plaintiff to hire Reynoso to
perform repair or remodel services. Authorizing a tenant to make cosmetic improvements to a
property while living in it is very different from hiring someone to make repairs or improvements
to the Property. Making the cosmetic improvements was not required under the contract between
Plaintiff and Reynoso, nor was Reynoso to be compensated for any improvements he made. He
was merely authorized under the contract to make cosmetic improvements if he chose to for his
own benefit. Accordingly, the undisputed evidence in the record regarding Appeliant's
authorization of Reynoso's acts in tearing down and destroying the residence prior to the loss
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destroying the residence or that she directed that the acts causing the loss be done.
Additionally, the District Court did not even address the second part of the exclusion,
which requires not only that the action be taken at the direction of the insured but that it be taken
"with the intent to cause a loss." There can be no claim in this case that the mere fact that
Appellant had authorized Ron Reynoso to make "certain improvements" to the dwelling that
were cosmetic in nature translates to her directing the actions of Ron Reynoso with the "intent to
cause a loss." In fact, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Ron Reynoso leased the property
with the intent to purchase it, and that he represented to the Appellant that he would live in the
dwelling during the time he leased it as his primary residence. The fact that Appellant reasonably
believed Ron Reynoso was going to live in the dwelling as his primary residence demonstrates
that she did not direct that he destroy it with the intent to cause a loss under the Policy. There is
simply no evidence that Plaintiff directed, or even authorized, him to destroy the property with
the intent to cause a loss.
The only way the District Court could have found a factual dispute as to whether the acts
of Reynoso causing the loss were authorized with the intent to cause a loss is if it was looking at
acts occurring after the complete tear down of the residence: after the acts causing the loss. In
that regard, Respondent had argued that after Appellant found out about the total destruction of
the residence, she allowed Ron Reynoso to continue to pay rent and allowed him time to follow
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on

not

to

contends, is evidence of her directing the acts of Ron Reynoso with the intent to cause a loss. It
is not. Whether or not Appellant acquiesced in Reynoso attempting to rebuild the property in an
attempt to mitigate her damages, after the acts causing the Joss were complete, is not relevant or
material to the question of whether the loss arose out of any act committed "by or at the
direction" of the Appellant with "with the intent to cause a loss.'' The subsequent promises to
rebuild the residence and fix the damage Reynoso had caused are not the loss. The loss was the
destruction of the residence as demonstrated by the before and after pictures at Ex. C and D of
the Affidavit of Shammie Fischer. There is simply no evidence that the destruction of the
residence occurred at the direction of or even with the knowledge of Appellant with the intent to
cause a loss and thus the District Court should have granted Appellant's motion for summary
judgment on the issue of the application of the intentional loss exclusion.

C.

The District Court Erred in Holding that the Exclusion For
Faulty, Inadequate and/or Defective Work Applied in This
Case

The District Court held that the exclusion for faulty or inadequate repair, renovation of
remodeling applied in this case and concluded that there was no coverage for Appellant's loss,
granting summary judgment in favor of the Respondent. The Idaho Supreme Court does not
appear to have interpreted a clause like this, and thus, the issue was a matter of first impression in
Idaho. The District Court therefore relied upon decisions from other jurisdictions in reaching its
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are
in ignoring decisions from other jurisdictions which were on point and

Court

provided persuasive authority in support of Appellant's claim that the exclusion did not apply.
Given the burden imposed upon the insurance company to prove that the exclusion
applies, see Perry v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 130 Idaho at 103,936 P.2d at 1345, and given
the persuasive authority from other jurisdictions interpreting the same exclusion and finding that
it did not prevent claims such as the Appellant's, the District Court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of Respondent. Rather, based upon the undisputed facts of record and based
upon the language of the exclusion, the District Court should have found that the exclusion did
not apply and should have granted summary judgment in favor of Appellant, not Respondent.
The exclusion for faulty or inadequate repair, renovation or remodeling, provides:
We do not insure for loss to property described in Coverages A and
B caused by ...
c.

Faulty, inadequate or defective;

(2)

design, specifications, workmanship, repair,
construction, renovation, remodeling,
grading, compaction;

(3)

materials used in repair,
construction, renovation or
remodeling; or

(4)
maintenance;
of part or all of any property whether on or off the Described Location.
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8

at

apply at all in

case as

are no claims involving maintenance

the dwelling. Likewise,

there are not claims based upon faulty, inadequate or defective materials used in construction.
Rather, the claim in this case is that Ron Reynoso tore down Plaintiff's dwelling and destroyed it
and the fixtures in it, without authorization or direction to do so. The District Court incorrectly
concluded that those acts were faulty, inadequate or defective workmanship, repair, construction,
renovation or remodeling, and that the exclusion applied.
The Idaho appellate courts do not appear to have addressed the issue of whether a faulty
workmanship, construction or renovation clause in an insurance policy acts as a bar to a claim
based upon the unauthorized demolition of a residence by a renter. Thus, this is a case of first
impression in Idaho. Other courts, however, have interpreted exclusions in policies with the
same language to apply only to situations where the work was performed by the insured or
someone authorized by the insured. This makes sense because it is generally understood that
actions involving construction, renovation, remodeling, grading, compaction and maintenance
are not performed by persons other than an owner of real property or by someone hired by them
to do such work.
The California Court of Appeals was asked to interpret a similar exclusion in Home

Savings of Am. v. Cont'! Ins. Co., wherein a lender sought recovery under an insurance policy for
the destruction of a residence by the insured for redevelopment purposes. 104 Cal.Rptr. 2d 790
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an
demolished for redevelopment. The lien holder sought damages under the policy for the
destruction of its security. The insurer argued that the exclusion for faulty or inadequate
renovation, development or remodeling applied. The court held that the exclusion did not apply,
and explained:
[W]e find that simply excluding damages flowing from faulty
construction is insufficient to exclude the loss caused by a third
party's intentional destruction of a secured residence.

Id. at 803. Similarly, in this case, excluding damages for inadequate remodel of the residence is
insufficient to exclude the loss caused by a third party, Ron Reynoso' s, intentional destruction of
the residence.
Similarly, in Husband v. LaFayette Ins., Co., a court held that in order for the exclusion
for faulty or inadequate renovation or remodel to apply, the alterations must be undertaken !!y

the insured or someone authorized bv the insured. 635 So.2d 309, 311 (La.App. 1994).
Specifically, the court agreed with the following conclusion of the trial court:

This court interprets the exclusion contained in the pertinent
policy provisions to apply to situations where the insured or
someone authorized by the insured contracts for alterations to
the propertv and is dissatisfied with the quality of the
performance under that contract. The insurer by this exclusion
intended to prevent the expansion of coverage under the policy to
insuring the quality of a contractual undertaking by the insured of
someone authorized by him.
However, in this case the alterations were undertaken without
authorization and in direct conflict with the terms of the lease,
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and therefore fall outside the exclusion of the policy.
Id., 635 So. 2d at 311 (emphasis added). In this case, the exclusion for faulty or inadequate

remodel or repair does not apply because the destruction of the insured dwelling by Ron Reynoso
was not done at the direction or with the authorization of the insured. Fisher Aff, at <j[ 9 (R. at
85).
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has also cited the same language from Husband and
has held that "the faulty workmanship policy exclusion was 'intended to prevent the expansion of
coverage under the policy to insuring the quality of a contractual undertaking by the insured or
someone authorized by him."' Fidelity Coop. Bank v. Nova Cas. Co., 726 F.3d 31, 38 (1st Cir.
2013) (quoting Husband v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 635 So. 2d 309, 311 (La.Ct.App. 1994)). In
Fidelity, a prior owner of property had made a roof repair. After the property was sold, there was

a major storm and the roof leaked causing extensive water damage. The insurer argued that the
exclusion for faulty workmanship or repair precluded coverage because the drain on the roof
repair was too small and thus the damage was caused by faulty workmanship. The court noted
that "the undisputed evidence on record [was] that the roof was repaired prior to the Knowles'
ownership, and that the Knowles did not repair, renovate or replace the roof or its drain .... " Id.
Because the work on the roof was not a contractual undertaking by the insured or someone
authorized by the insured, the exclusion did not apply.
Similarly, in this case, the exclusion for faulty workmanship, renovation or repair is
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undertaking by

or someone authorized by him." Id. Because there was

no contractual undertaking by Appellant to have her home remodeled by Reynoso, and because
Reynoso destroyed the home without her authorization, the exclusion does not apply.
Finally, the Supreme Court of New York has reached the same conclusion as to the
meaning of the policy exclusion for "faulty, inadequate or defective ... design, specifications,
workmanship, repair, construction, renovation or remodeling, grading, compaction .... " I I
Essex St. Corp. v. Tower Ins. Co. of New York, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3556, 234 N.Y.L.J. 115

(S.Ct. New York 2005). In I I Essex St. Corp., the defendant argued that the "faulty
workmanship" exclusion (identical to the exclusion in this case) applied to preclude coverage for
damage to the building of its insured, which was allegedly caused by negligent construction at an
adjacent work site. Id. at 3556,

In holding that the exclusion did not apply, the court cited

Husband as follows:

Following the principles of construction, this court is persuaded
that the faulty workmanship exclusion applies to situations only
"where the insured or someone authorized by the insured contracts
for alterations to the property and is dissatisfied with the quality of
the performance under that contract."
Id. at 3556, *5 (quoting Husband v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 635 So. 2d 309, 311 (La.Ct.App. 1994)).

Thus, because the work at the adjacent site that allegedly caused the damage was not done by the
insured or someone authorized by the insured, the exclusion did not apply.
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or renovation exclusion is to apply only to situations where the insured or someone
authorized by the insured contracts for alterations to the property and is dissatisfied with the
quality of the performance under that contract. There is no need for additional language in the
exclusion stating that the \Vork be done by or at the direction of the insured.
In reaching its decision that the faulty workmanship, construction or renovation exclusion
did apply, the District Court ignored the reasoning in the cases cited above, and instead relied
upon two decisions from other jurisdictions, one from the Washington Court of Appeals that did
not address the issue in this case, and one from a federal district court in California, which dealt
with facts entirely different from those in this case. The District Court erred in following the
decisions in those cases, and ignoring the on point analysis in the majority of courts addressing
this issue in reaching its decision that the exclusion applied.

In Capelouto v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 900 P.2d 414 (Wash. App. 1999), a Washington
Court of Appeal case relied upon by the District Court in reaching its decision, the issue of
whether the work performed was authorized by or contracted for by the plaintiff was not even
addressed. In Capelouto, the plaintiff sought coverage for damage to his property that was
caused by work done on a sewer system off his property. The court held that the exclusion for
faulty, inadequate or defective construction applied to "damage cause by a contractor's use of an
inadequate pump on a sewer replacement project off the insured premises." Id. at 417. The
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not
sewer

or

on

in opposition to the application of the exclusion. Rather, the issue raised by

plaintiff in that case and addressed by the court was whether the use of inadequate equipment fell
under the exclusion. The court held that it did. At no point did the court address the issues
before the Court in this case, nor did the court address the decisions and analysis cited in this
case. Thus, the Capelouto decision does not provide any guidance as the issue in this case, and
should not have been relied upon by the District Court in reaching its decision that the exclusion
applied under the facts of this case.
The District Court also erred in relying upon Stephens v. Liberty Mut, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12243, 2008 WL 480287 (N.Dist. Cal. 2008), because that case also did not contain any
analysis of the issue of whether the faulty, inadequate or defective construction applied to
situations where an unauthorized third party destroyed real property and involved facts
distinguishable from this case. In Stephens, the plaintiff sought coverage for damage to its
property caused by the demolition of an adjacent building and the construction of a new parking
garage on that site. Id. at

The plaintiff in Stephens was made aware of the demolition plans

and had hired its own licenced contractor to participate in a "peer review" committee regarding
the project. Id. at * 4. Plaintiffs engineers gave input into the demolition work before it
occurred and commented to the design team working on the project stating "we believe the
design team has appropriately responded to our comments .... " Id. at *5. Thus, the plaintiff in
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a

aware

This is significantly different from the facts in this case, where Appellant did not know of
the demolition until after it had occurred and she had suffered a loss.
Additionally, while the court in Stephens held that the "question here is whether coverage
is excluded under the 'faulty construction' and 'third party negligence' exclusions," it concluded
with no analysis whatsoever, that "[r]esolving that question does not depend upon determining
whether plaintiffs or Olympic Club authorized the construction or hired the contractor, or
whether the alleged damage occurred before the policy period began." Id. at *40. The court
made this conclusory holding without addressing any of the cases from other jurisdictions
addressing the issue, including Home Savings of Am. v. Cont'! Ins. Co., 104 Cal.Rptr. 2d 790
(Ct.App. 2001), which was a California state court decision and clearly would be persuasive
authority for the California federal district court ruling on California state law. Due to the failure
of the federal district court to address the issues raised by Appellant in this case, and because the
facts differ substantially between this case, the District Court erred in relying upon that decision
in reaching its conclusion that the exclusion for faulty or inadequate workmanship, construction
or renovation exclusion applied. The District Court should have following the reasoning in the
majority of jurisdictions interpreting the exclusion, and found that the exclusion does not apply
under the facts in this case.
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At

most basic

the District Court held

case was that "the

here

was caused directly by faulty inadequate or defective work as set forth in the exclusion," and
there is not coverage for Appellant's loss. Decision, at 14 (R. at 236). Putting all of the case law
and argument aside, this conclusion simply does not make sense under the facts of this case and
results in a tortured interpretation of the insurance policy and what it means for a homeowner to
endeavor to make repairs to a property or to remodel or do construction on a property.
In this case, the homeowner was not involved in any way in the complete destruction of
her property. Appellant was unaware of the destruction caused by her tenant until after it was
complete. At that point, she was a victim of his tortious act. She did not have a breach of
contract claim against him for faulty work or remodeling or construction because there was no
agreement that he perform any such work. The exclusion for faulty work contained in the
insurance policy contemplates that the insured does work to remodel, build or repair a premises
or hires someone else to do it. The Policy need not contain language to that effect because it is
understood that work to repair, remodel or construct property is always done at with the
knowledge or participation of the owner. When an unauthorized third party destroys property,
that it not remodeling, building or repair, under any reasonable interpretation of the insurance
policy.
Holding that after the total destruction, allowing the tenant to have time to attempt to
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cannot

seen

an

remodel the premises. Moreover, there is no evidence in this case

to

or

the tenant actually did any

work after the destruction was caused, with the knowledge of the Appellant, which caused the
loss. This is not a case where the tenant attempted to rebuild and did a poor job, this is not a case
where the Appellant hired the tenant to rebuild her property and he failed to do it. This is a case
where the tenant destroyed the property, and Appellant attempted to mitigate her damages by
continuing to collect rent from him while he made promises that he would fix the damage, which
he did not. To hold as the District Court did in this case takes away all incentive of a homeowner
to attempt to mitigate its damages, and results in the unreasonable conclusion that if an
unauthorized third party does damage to property, it is excluded from coverage as an attempt to
remodel or work on the property. This simply defies common sense and logic.
Given the burden on the insurance company to clearly demonstrate the application of the
exclusion, there is no way that Respondent can meet that burden in this case. The exclusion for
faulty or inadequate work does not apply, and summary judgment should have been granted to
Appellant by the District Court.
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upon the

Appellant respectfully

the judgment

the District

Court be reversed, and that judgment be entered in favor of the Appellant on the issue of
insurance coverage under the Policy for her losses.
DATED this 2Yh day of July, 2016.
KAUFMAN REID, PLLC
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